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Abstract
This paper challenges the notion that changes in flood risk will have a minimal
impact on population because of the availability of insurance and that most of the
effect, if any, will be borne out by the real estate market. Insurance premiums even
when subsidized are a cost that a household will need to pay with the increase in flood
risk. The evidence suggests that flood events, historical and contemporaneous, play a
role in the determination of the local perceived flood risk. Attractive communities that
have positive growth before the flood surprise are hardest hit. They see a persistent
1.4% dip in population with a 0.7% decrease in the pre-flood trend. Flooding does not
affect population in the rest of the high surprise locations. Instead, they see close to
4% drop real estate values with the biggest effect among higher tier housing. There is
also evidence that flood incidence in these communities is higher among the low-income
population as suggested by relief payments by FEMA.
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1 Introduction
Extreme weather and the resulting damage is a frequent concern for a big fraction of the
US population. Flooding is one of the most destructive consequences since water damage
is hard to reverse when it comes to building structures and equipment. This is why the
US Federal Government has instituted and maintains a highly subsidized flood insurance
program. The availability of insurance implies that households in flood-prone areas can
minimize their flood risk exposure. The fact that premiums are subsidized and do not
re-price after flooding suggests that a bigger portion of the population can afford to live
in relatively risky locations compared to a system with premiums more closely tied to risk.
Consequently, changes in climate which bring more extreme weather and create the potential
for flooding in unexpected places will leave population patterns unaltered – historically
flood-prone places already minimize risk through insurance while newly flooded places will
start utilizing insurance as flood risk increases. Real estate prices can decline to reflect the
additional cost of insurance as more risk-tolerant households replace less risk-tolerant ones
but the total population is not expected to fundamentally change as locations become more
prone to flooding unless local productivity is affected.
This paper challenges the notion that changes in flood risk will have a minimal impact
on population because of the availability of insurance and that most of the effect, if any, will
be borne out by the real estate market. Insurance premiums even when subsidized are a cost
that a household will need to pay with the increase in flood risk. Additionally, there are other
costs such as foregone wages and temporary relocation expenses which are not insurable. An
upward revision in flood risk can therefore make a location less attractive compared to other
places with similar characteristics but unchanged flood risk. While people already in places
where risk increases usually leave after selling at a discount, keeping population unchanged,
new movers who choose among a set of destinations will likely steer away. Increases in the
flood probability can, therefore, not only affect real estate values but also total population,
especially in places that were an attractive destination prior to the risk revision.
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I evaluate the effect of upward revisions of flood risk on population and real estate
prices. To identify flooding and flood surprises I compile a new comprehensive dataset that
includes insured and uninsured damage at the level of the community between 2003 and 2013.
Insured damage is based on records by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) while
uninsured damage is based on information from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and the Small Business Administration (SBA). The compiled flood information
measures damage consistently and allows for comparison across locations and over time.
Revisions of flood risk are likely to occur in communities with low flood history which do
experience a flood event. I use information from NFIP on total losses between 1978 and 2000
to identify locations with flood surprises and examine the effect of likely risk revision on total
population and real estate values. I further explore the role of new movers by separating
locations with risk revisions based on their pre-event growth. Finally, I examine the regional
heterogeneity of the national results.
The evidence suggests that flood events, historical and contemporaneous, play a role
in the determination of the local perceived flood risk. The average insurance payouts are
almost double at locations with history of flood losses. With risk already high enough in these
places insurance purchase is likely common. Floods in communities with low historical losses
generate smaller payouts which suggests that they were not widely expected and constitute
flood surprises. I find a big distinction in the impact of floods in the latter communities, a
result consistent with increases in perceived risk. Population declines by 0.3% relative to a
fixed effect and a linear trend during the year following the event. The effect persists in the
period after the impact year with an average decline close to 0.5%. There is also evidence
of a break in the pre-flood trend. Locations with low surprise events do not experience
any population changes. Attractive communities that have positive growth before the flood
surprise are hardest hit. They see a persistent 1.4% dip in population with a 0.7% decrease
in the pre-flood trend. Flooding does not affect population in the rest of the high surprise
locations. Instead, they see close to a 4% drop real estate values with the biggest effect
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among higher tier housing. There is also evidence that flood incidence in these communities is
higher among the low-income population as suggested by relief payments by FEMA. Housing
values are not affected in the attractive communities which suggests that they do not price
the increased flood risk and effectively become more expensive. This is possibly driven by
previous strong demand for new housing and expectations that flood impact is transitory.
Regional evidence strongly suggests that the population decline in attractive communities
after a flood surprise is a general phenomenon across the nation. The events considered do
not significantly impact the housing supply – the median damage as a fraction of total real
estate value is 0.05%, the 75th percentile is 0.14%, and the 95th percentile is 0.87%. The
relative small size implies that observed effects are due to revisions in risk expectations.
The results in this paper help us understand how flooding, the most significant source of
impact from natural disasters, affects where people live and how its risk is reflected in house
values. They allow us to interpret the effect of possible climate change across the country
and how many people will remain in relatively risky locations over time. Expectations about
flood risk are critical and more important than overall level of damage. As a result population
and real estate effects only emerge after flood surprises – in the rest of the cases flood events
appear to already be incorporated in these variables and only generate insurance payouts.
This is an interesting result given the wide availability of flood insurance which can minimize
the upward revision of risk after flood surprises. It further implies that natural disasters are
not necessarily exogenous events in all locations, only the actual timing is. The evidence in
the paper also emphasizes that a general economic analysis of the impact of natural disasters
has to account for changes in perceived risk. The response of the local economy at a low
surprise location may not be comparable to that of a high surprise one because of the different
population and real estate trajectories. The results also emphasize that the attractiveness
of the community determines how it is ultimately impacted by surprises: strong demand for
new housing means that population is mostly affected; weaker demand implies that house
prices are mostly affected.
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This paper can be placed within several different literatures. First, it is related to the
broad literature on location choice and the spatial labor market equilibrium (Moretti (2011),
Gleaser and Gyourko (2005), Gleaser and Gottlieb (2009), Diamond (2014)). This paper is
close in spirit to Topel (1986) who also emphasizes the importance of expectations in the
location choice. This literature generally investigates the effect of Bartik-style productivity
shocks across local markets on migration, real estate prices, and wages. The shock I study
affects expectations about the future cost of living but has a minimal effect on local pro-
ductivity since most of the damage is relatively small. Second, the paper is related to the
literature on natural disasters. This literature mostly focuses on the effect of hurricanes at
different geographical levels and measures damage in a variety of ways. The current study
also includes hurricanes since they produce significant flood damage. Strobl (2011) uses wind
speed as a proxy for damage and finds that hurricanes lower county GDP by 0.5% and do not
change total population but affect its composition. Deryugina (2017) uses hurricane paths
and simulation estimates of damage to examine the disaster and non-disaster transfers to
affected communities as well as the effect on demographic and economic variables. She finds
that population is not affected. Both papers utilize county-level data based on estimates
of damage based on hurricane locations. I use community-level losses that are consistently
imputed by federal agencies and do not rely on associations between wind speed/hurricane
path and damage. Importantly, I focus on communities where flood events constitute sur-
prises and lead to changes in perceived risk since this is where the biggest impact is likely to
occur. Third, this paper is related to the literature on expectation formation and learning
after rare events. It is close to Gallagher (2014) which examines the change in insurance take
up after flood events. The paper concludes that flood events lead to revisions of perceived
risk which lead to higher insurance purchase that is not very persistent. The evidence is
complementary to my findings since it suggests that living in flooded communities becomes
more expensive.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional details
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of the flood insurance program and describes how the flood data was compiled. Section 3
presents the main results. Section 4 examines the regional heterogeneity of the main results.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Flooding Dataset and Institutional Details
Flood insurance in the US is administered by the federal government through the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The program makes insurance available at communities
that maintain a flood zone map and enforce local building code. The map delineates Special
Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) with varying degrees of flood risk. Two general SFHAs are
the 100-year and 500-year flood zones where flood is expected to occur with certainty every
100/500 years respectively. The risk within the 500-year SFHA is not uniform – areas close
to the 100-year zone will have a higher risk of flooding if the geography is similar. Insurance
purchase is mandatory for structures within the 100-year zone but not required elsewhere.
This is important because risk expectations rather than local regulation will determine the
insurance purchase outside of the 100-year zone.
NFIP maintains an official record of the number of policies sold, total coverage, and total
payouts at the level of a given community since the program effectively partners with the lo-
cal authority enforcing the flood map and building code. The geographical level is consistent
with the US Census definition of general-purpose government units such as cities, towns,
townships, as well as the remaining county areas (county balance). Insurance information
includes homeowners and business structures. NFIP does not list payouts associated with
particular flood events. Instead, it shows up-to-date payouts starting from 1978. I use his-
torical observations of the official record taken approximately twice a year between 2003 and
2014 to calculate the amount of new payouts claimed at each community. These represent
insured damages associated with flood events during each year. I carefully link the observed
payouts to the set of FEMA disaster declarations for each state. The matching was not
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automated but involved reading the description of FEMA declarations for each state/year
and associating flood events in the covered counties to observed insurance payouts at com-
munities in those counties. This link allows me to identify both the amount of insured and
uninsured damages for each FEMA event. The uninsured damages are sourced from FEMA’s
individual/public assistance data and from Small Business Administration?s (SBA) individ-
ual/business lending data. A disaster declaration makes federal funding available to affected
individuals without insurance. They can receive either a direct non-refundable payment
or a highly subsidized loan depending on their ability to take on additional credit. Jaffe
(2015) suggests that FEMA requests detailed financial information with the application for
relief which is used to determine whether the applicant is contacted directly by FEMA or by
SBA. FEMA administers the direct payments and SBA extends the loans. Both maintain
a registry that identifies the amount of assistance provided and the related total damage at
the zip-code level for each disaster declaration. Altogether, total damage in the data has
four components: insured individual+business from NFIP; uninsured individual from FEMA
and SBA; uninsured business from SBA; uninsured public from FEMA. In this paper I focus
primarily on total damage. The components are only used to control for events where most
of the damage comes from one of the source.
Population information comes from the annual US Census estimates for cities and towns.
The geographical detail of this data maps directly into the community level of the flood
damage data. Locations with less than fifteen thousand people are combined with the county
balance areas to make sure that results are not driven by very small settlements. Real estate
information comes from the Zillow service and is available at the zip-code level. It provides
estimates of house values separated into three tiers. These are calculated by splitting the
price distribution of all housing into three parts and reporting the middle point of each.
The rest of the information used in this paper comes from the 2000 US Census data at the
block-group level.
The paper identifies floods according to the relative size of the damages. Cases where
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more than 0.01% of the total real estate value of the community is destroyed constitute a
flood event while the rest are censored. I focus on a wide spectrum of events because relative
damage is context specific – less destructive floods can have significant impact on perceived
risk if they occur in areas with no flood history.
The first panel of Figure 1 shows a map of all communities that flooded between 2003
and 2013. Flooding appears to be widespread across the country and not only a coastal
phenomenon. In the interior major floods result from significant rain or snowmelt which
causes rivers and creeks to spill in the surrounding areas. Some of the communities in the
sample experience repeated disasters during the sample period. I will separate these into a
different category since their event study explicitly includes an interim period. Furthermore,
the fact that these places flood so frequently suggests that they are fundamentally different
from the rest of the cases. The second panel of Figure 1 shows single and multiple flood
locations. There are about three times more single than multiple hit places (1,519 vs 542). A
significant portion of the latter are located by the coast while the former are more uniformly
distributed.
Table 1 lists some summary statistics for the flood data. The information is categorized
by the number of floods since this allows us to focus on the two major groups in the analysis:
places with no floods and places with one flood. The latter also included places with two
back-to-back floods across two years. There are 1,771 communities without any flooding and
1,519 with one flood. Median population at each group is approximately 34/31 thousand,
respectively; median growth rate is 0.55%/0.39% respectively. Relative damage varies from
0.02% at the 25th percentile to 0.87% at the 95th/3.23% at the 99th percentile. In dollar
values these are $0.64 million (25th percentile), $42.39 million (95th percentile), and $289
million (99th percentile). The distribution within each state shows that there are sufficient
number of locations without any flooding.
I identify flood surprises by utilizing the total number of structures completely destroyed
due to flooding between 1978 and 2003. This information is available from the NFIP data for
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each community and captures the its flood history. I further normalize this number by the
total building structures and compare to the state median across all location that experience
a flood. Communities below the median are considered low-risk and flood event is assumed
to generate a higher surprise than the rest. This ensures that there are sufficient number of
places which can be placed within each category and that the distinction between high and
low surprise is region specific.
The second panel of Figure 2 separates the high/low surprise locations. These tend to be
contiguous suggesting that flood surprises occur when a flood extends beyond a high-risk area
and into a low-risk one. High-risk areas also tend to be contiguous to multiple-flood areas
which reinforces the assumption that the former are at a generally higher risk of disaster.
The map also confirms that high/low surprise locations are relatively close and are part of
the same economic area.
3 Main Results
One of the main results in the paper is that the extent to which disaster damages affect
a community is determined by its historical experience. Flooding at communities with low
flood history constitutes a surprise which increases expected future risk and raises the cost of
living in such places. To set the stage for the formal results, consider the experience of three
communities in Connecticut: Milford, Bridgeport, and New Haven. All were affected by
hurricane Irene in 2011 and Sandy in 2012. Since the events were consecutive they fall in the
single-flood group with no interim period. Milford made it into the local news for the extent
of losses and the fact that no one had the intention to move. It suffered $90 mil in damages
(0.5% of real estate value) while Bridgeport and New Haven suffered $16 mil (0.12%)/$7
mil (0.05%). The difference in damages implies that Milford should be affected significantly
more but its flood history suggests that the event was not such a surprise. Between 1978 and
2003 Milford lost 6.2% of its structures due to flooding while Bridgeport and New Haven lost
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0.7%/0.5% respectively. Figure 3 shows the population growth for each of the communities.
We see that the population in Milford was not affected. At the same time the communities
with smaller overall damage but with relatively low history of floods experienced population
declines. Notice that the communities did not experience a large-scale disaster since damages
were relatively small. Nevertheless, they seem to have changed the expectations about future
flood risk and the attractiveness of the communities with low history.
Flood Surprise and Insurance Payouts
The first set of formal results examine the extent to which historical flood losses can be used
to identify flood surprises. Regulations require that structures within the 100-year flood zone
carry insurance if they have a federally-backed mortgage. Insurance purchase for any other
structures will depend to some extent on the perceived risk of a flood. High flood history
increases perceived risk and leads to insurance purchase. I examine this relation by comparing
the average insurance payouts across the high/low flood history groups in the cross-section
of all events. In particular, I test whether a given amount of total damage (insured and
uninsured) generates more insurance payouts in locations with historical exposure to flood
events i.e. low-surprise communities. I estimate:
ln (Payouts)i = αt + βHit
SF
i ×Dami + γHitSFi ×Dami × LSurprisei + {MFl}+ i (1)
where Payouts is total insurance payouts per capita after an event at community i and αt
is an year effect. HitSFi is an indicator for a flood at a single-flood location i, Dami is total
damage per capita (insured+uninsured), and LSurprisei is an indicator for low surprise
flooding (high flood history). {MFl} abbreviates the same set of indicators for locations
with multiple floods. Positive γ implies that higher overall damage leads to more insurance
payouts at places with high history of flooding relative to places with low history. I estimate
two variants of the model above: with and without controlling for total damage. In the
latter case γ represents how much more insurance payouts are generated during an average
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flood event at a communities with history of flooding. It is possible that an average flood
event in these communities is much more destructive so I also estimate the model holding
total damage constant.
Table 2 shows the estimation results. Communities with a low-surprise flood i.e. high
flood history have a significantly higher insurance payouts per capita during an average
flood event. These locations receive almost double the insurance compensation after an event
compared to locations with low previous experience with flooding. Column 2 of Table 2 looks
at the regional heterogeneity of this result. I find that high history is associated with higher
insurance payout across the US regions. Notice that the Mid-Atlantic and South Atlantic
region have higher than national average payouts but even there low surprise communities
receive higher amounts. It is possible that low surprise events generate more insurance
payouts because they experience more damaging events. Column (3) accommodates this
by controlling for overall damage. 1% increase in total damage leads to 0.43% increase in
insurance payouts at communities with low history of flooding and 0.66% increase in payouts
at high flood history locations. Communities with previous floods 50% more of the damage
through insurance compared to the rest. Column (4) shows that this result is consistent
across regions of the US. Interestingly, the Mid-Atlantic area covers a bigger proportion of
the overall damages with insurance but history of flooding still drives higher payouts.
Overall, the results provide evidence that flood surprises are related to flood history. They
also suggest that high damages in general do not necessarily lead to high impact on the local
economy, outside rebuilding activities, because those may be in line with expectations and
do not change the perceived risk.
Population Responses
Next I examine how the population of communities is affected by flood events focusing on
surprises and the level of attractiveness prior to the event. I estimate the following model in
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several variations:
lnPopit = αi+ti+γst+β1Hit
SF
it−1+β2PostHit
SF
it−2+β3PostTrend
SF
it−2+δXit−1+{MFlit−1}+it (2)
Log population for community i within state s in year t is explained by an individual average,
αi, individual linear trend, ti, and a state-year effect, γst. This specification is flexible enough
to allow for time-invariant difference in settlement size and community-specific difference in
the population trajectory. The former is important given the heterogeneity in community
size in the data. The latter accounts for differences in productivity, amenities, and prior
flood events which give rise to different population changes across locations. The state-year
effect captures variations in local population which can be traced to the state/national level.
The Great Recession is an important factor in the sample which has affected population and
can be accommodated with the state-year controls.
I identify the effect of floods by first separating communities according to the number of
floods. For the case of the single-flood group (SF) I include an indicator for the year after
the flood, HitSFit−1 , an indicator for the period from the second year onwards, PostHit
SF
it−2,
and a trend break after the flood, PostTrendSFit−2. For the case of more than one floods
I additionally include an indicator for the period(s) between the floods. The results in
this paper focus on the single-hit communities since they represent the bulk of the location
count and the identification is more straightforward. The β1 represents the contemporaneous
effect of the flood i.e. within the first year; β2 captures the persistence of the initial effect;
β3 allows for a change in the trend relative to the pre-flood one. Xit−1 includes a set of
additional important indicators that have been interacted with HitSFit−1, PostHit
SF
it−2, and
PostTrendSFit−2. These include indicators for: top 66th percentile of FEMA/NFIP/SBA
business/SBA homeowners damage shares; bottom 33th percentile of relative damages; top
50th percentile of share of non-construction occupations; top 50th percentile of share of
renters. The last two indicators are based on the 2000 Census values and therefore are
time-invariant. While the fixed effects already control for these differences I can still identify
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whether locations with more non-construction workers and more renters respond differently
to flood events. The first controls for the diversity in the local job opportunities and the
second controls for capacity to accommodate the displaced from floods. Both can lead to
increases in local population even if the community is hit by a flood. Additionally, flood
events lead to an inflow of emergency/construction/temporary workers. These will likely be
housed in communities with higher capacity of rentals. This is the reason why I control for
the rental share. This control will not be sufficient if these additional workers are placed in
temporary housing. In this case it is important to examine the persistence of the estimated
flood impact since temporary workers will lead to a reversal of the initial impact as they
leave. Higher PostHit estimate is consistent with outflow of temporary workers.
The baseline results assume that the level of flood surprise does not affect the responses.
I examine whether these differ by the level of surprise. Finally, I separate the impact by
pre-flood population growth (last five years). Most communities have turnover in local
population. Growing locations attract more new comers and experience demand for new
housing because of improved labor market or/and local amenities. Conditioning on pre-
growth can reveal how persistent demand for housing affects the overall response to a flood
surprise. It also helps us interpret the trend break by identifying whether growing or stagnant
locations see a change in trajectory. Note that pre-growth is time varying while the controls
for the local economy/renters are not. The former accounts for higher-frequency shocks while
the latter identifies lower-frequency ones such as whether the location is a bigger city. For
example, places with diversified local economies are not expected to necessarily be growing.
For that to happen they need additionally to be affected by a productivity shock. Although
both factors are important I focus on the effect of the higher-frequency shock and simply
control for the other one.
Table 3 shows the results from the population model. Each of the three versions of the
baseline model includes estimates without/with Xit−1 controls. Population at the average
location with flood from model (1) is not impacted by the event. The average location from
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model (2) with less diversified economy and lower availability of rentals among other controls
sees a 0.92% decline in population in the year following the event. This decline is persistent
and is accompanied by a decline in the pre-flood trajectory of 0.4%. The difference in results
comes from the fact that the composition of the local economy, the availability of rentals, and
the share of FEMA-recoded damages each soften the flood impact or in some cases increase
population. While these are important results on their own the paper focuses on the impact
of flood surprises and persistent demand for new housing so they are designated to the set
of controls. Overall, model (2) shows that flooded places with lower rental share, higher
construction occupations share, and intermediate damage shares see a decrease in expected
population which is persistent and accompanied by a trend break. Even without accounting
for the level of surprise population is negatively impacted.
The effect of flood surprises is identified in model (3) and (4). In both cases they lead to
significant declines in population on impact and in the following periods. An average location
from (3) is only affected when the flood is unexpected. On impact expected population
drop by 0.3%; the effect is persistent; pre-flood trend declines by 0.15% after the event.
Compared to (1) where floods do not affect population we see that identifying surprises is
critical. This is consistent with the insurance results and suggests that revisions of flood risk
disrupt the pre-flood population dynamic. In the case with controls flood surprises generate
significantly bigger declines in population: 1.2% decline on impact, 1% in the post period,
and 0.6% decline in pre trend. Low surprise floods also affect population. Interestingly, the
regional results show that this effect is not a nation-wide phenomenon but comes from the
northeastern region. Both estimates (3) and (4) strongly suggest that expected population
declines when a flood occurrence breaks with historical experience. While the initial decline
in population is persistent it is still relatively small at 1%. The trend break represents a much
bigger impact on the population of a community following the event. A 0.6% decline in the
pre-trend amounts to a 3%/6% lower population in 5/10 years relative to where population is
expected to be without the flood. The fact that most events have relatively small magnitude
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implies that the effect stems from revisions of risk expectations. Consequently, biggest
population changes will not necessarily overlap with biggest damages. Flooding seems to
lead to some population increases in places with more diversified local economies and more
rental capacity. This offsets the negative effect from the increase in riskiness. In the cases of
flood surprises the second effect is much stronger and leads to overall decrease in population.
The evidence so far shows that surprises disrupt the pre-existing population trajectory.
A decline in the linear trend implies a slow down in expansion and stabilizing of population
in a growing location; in a stable or declining place it implies loss of population or an
acceleration of such loss. To help interpret the trend break I separate the impact effects
according to pre-flood growth: positive and negative growth in the preceding five years.
This also helps understand how a productivity/amenity shock interacts with risk revisions.
The results in (5) and (6) show that the surprise driven population decline occurs primarily
in attractive communities with higher pre-flood growth. Population drops by 0.55%/1.4%
without/with controls and remains lower in the post period. There is a decline in the pre
trend of 0.4%/0.8%. These communities effectively stop expanding after the flood surprise
and population becomes fixed at its pre-flood level. Locations with declining population
are either not affected (with controls) or see an increase (without controls). The difference
in outcomes by pre-growth after the surprise strongly suggests that the population decline
works through the demand for new housing or excess of newcomers. This is consistent with
a decrease in the attractiveness of the community following a revision of expected flood
risk. Importantly, it requires that the real estate market does not fully compensate the risk
increase with a discount that offsets the cost of insurance. Similarly, the fact that lower
growth communities are not affected suggests that the real estate there may be discounted
providing compensation for higher risk.
It is important to point out an issue that relates to the possible endogeneity of flooding
and local economic factors such as high poverty. It is possible that poor communities invest
less in flood protection and ultimately experience bigger damages. Here it really matters how
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poverty or a local economic factor is related to the population trajectory before the flood
and after the flood. If either of these cause population to be decreasing before the flood then
I incorporate this in the model by allowing the trajectory to be different before the flood.
For an impact to be significant in this case we have to see that population declines even
more than suggested by pre-flood rates driven by poverty or an economic factor. If these
factors cause population to respond differently only after the flood i.e. a poor place grows
just as rich place before the flood then it is hard for me to disentangle the effect. I can only
do it by allowing poor places to respond in a different way after the shock. I accommodate
this possibility with a set of controls described above.
Real Estate Responses
I examine how the housing market responds to surprises and more specifically whether there
is evidence of compensating effects by estimating the most restricted version of the model
as in (6) above. Results are listed in Table 4 for each of the three tiers provided by Zillow.
There is no evidence that housing values compensate for the increase in flood risk at
locations with high pre growth. This is the case for all three tiers of housing. This is
consistent with the decrease in population following the event in that potential movers into
the location see an increased cost associated with the destination – both the insurance
premium and uninsurable damage. The persistent demand for new housing before the event
or the expectation that the event is transitory seem to prevent house prices from adjusting.
Interestingly, housing in low growth communities declines after a surprise. Top and middle-
tier housing decrease by 2.3%-3.4% on impact; the dip is persistent and remains at close to
4.4% in the post period. Bottom-tier housing does not appear to decrease on impact although
there is evidence of a decline in the post period. The change in real estate prices paired with
the lack of population declines suggests that locations without demand for additional housing
provide a discount that can compensate for the increase in expected flood risk and the
associated costs. This result is consistent with the literature that looks at how health risks
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are priced into real estate values (Davis (2004)). All together the housing and population
results suggest the following interpretation. Flood surprises drive upward revisions of the
underlying probability of a future flood which in turn raises the cost of living. In locations
where demand for housing is low existing structures are sold at a discount that covers the
additional cost. This appears to be sufficient to maintain the existing population trajectory.
In location where demand for housing is high structures are not sold at a discount, possibly
due to expectations that the pre-growth will be maintained, which drives new movers to
other destinations.
Low wealth incidence
The decline in house prices is consistent with turnover in the community whereby higher-
risk tolerant households replace less-risk tolerant ones after a reduction in prices. This leaves
population unchanged but alters the type of people remaining. This is an example of sorting
based on changes in perceived risk. It relies on the assumption that households can finance
their exit from the community by trading their house for a comparable structure somewhere
else. If this is not the case sorting will not take place as people are prevented from leaving.
This is an example of a lock-in effect (Stein (1995)).
I examine the extent to which low wealth can explain the lack of population changes in
low growth areas. I do this by using the FEMA relief payments data. Guidelines from the
agency imply that lower income applicants for disaster relief will be given non-refundable
payments as opposed to loans. A lower-wealth household will be able to pay lower amount
out of pocket and therefore will likely be given a higher non-refundable payment for a given
amount of damage. I test whether flood incidence among low-wealth households is higher
in low growth communities by examining total FEMA payments per damage recorded and
how they differ in low-growth communities. In particular I estimate:
ln(FemaPay)i = βDami + γ1Dami × LSurpi + γ2Dami × LGri + αY + {MulF l}+ i (3)
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where FemaPay is total relief payments per capita, Dam is total damages recorded, and αY
is a year effect. The specification estimates the fraction of damages disbursed by fema, β,
and allows this to be different for low-surprise events, γ1, and at low growth locations, γ2.
Positive γ2 indicates that FEMA disburses more per given amount of damages in low growth
locations, a result consistent with higher low-wealth incidence of flooding.
Results are shown in Table 5. The national cross-section, (1), reveals that low-growth
locations do receive more non-refundable payments per recorded damage. When I estimate
the same model allowing for regional heterogeneity we see that floods affect poorer commu-
nities in low growth areas mostly in Northeast and Mid/South Atlantic. Overall, there is
evidence that at least in some parts of the US insufficient wealth can explain the lack of
population change after flood surprises. It suggests that sorting will not necessarily occur
in these parts. It still remains to be seen how real estate values respond in those regions as
well.
Let us go back to the case of Milford vs the two neighbors. Figure 4 shows the evolution
of population and real estate. Milford has a high history of flooding and the flood events
do not constitute surprises. We see that population and real estate values (top tier) are not
affected. New Haven and Bridgeport, on the other hand, see a decline in population but
in line with the results in this section housing closely follows the trajectory of Milford and
does not decline. This puts the two neighbors in the high-pre-growth group where demand
for new housing seems to prevent a compensating decline that offsets higher risk. The cost
increase is consistent with population decline.
4 Regional Results
The main results are based on a national sample which combines locations across various ge-
ographies each with specific climates and regulatory settings. The econometric specification
accounts for this heterogeneity with the individual average, trend, and state-year effects but
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we cannot be certain that the identified responses are a general phenomenon occurring across
the country. It is possible that population responds strongly only in one area of the US with
there being no effect elsewhere. Additionally, I have also argued that real estate variations
are closely related and help understand population effects. It is important to confirm that
this relationship is maintained within separate regions. I investigate within-country hetero-
geneity by allowing the main coefficients to vary by a grouping based on a mix between
Census divisions and regions – region 1 is split into Northeast and Mid-Atlantic; region 3 is
split into South Atlantic and South Central.
The regional results for population are listed in Table 6. The table includes coefficients
from one estimation – different columns show estimates by surprise/pre-growth group. For
example, the coefficients for the high-surprise/high-growth group from the Mid-Atlantic re-
gion is listed in the second column rows 2, 8, and 14. The results confirm that surprises affect
population at high pre-growth communities. Not all regions experience on impact, post, and
trend break effects but all of them feature some combination. This suggests that the national
results identify a general phenomenon where new movers choose a different destination after
risk increases. Notice that the population decline at high pre-growth communities with low
surprises estimated in the main results actually can be traced exclusively to the Northeast
region and is not as general. This cautions against directly interpreting the national results
without confirming that they hold at the regional level.
Regional real estate results for top-tier housing are shown in Table 7. We see no real
estate depreciation in any of the regions for high-surprise/high-growth locations. The only
exception is the Northeast region which sees a trend break. This supports the interpretation
of the population declines. The case of the South Atlantic is somewhat different. High-
surprise/high-growth areas do not experience population decline on impact – they see a
trend break. This implies that population was not significantly affected and demand for new
housing persisted. Uninterrupted population is reflected in the increase in house prices for
this group. This suggests that expected flood risk may not have adjusted significantly after
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the flood surprises. Alternatively, it is likely that the high-surprise group includes locations
where risk is already perceived to be high – consistent with the insurance estimates for South
Atlantic in Table 2.
Housing depreciates in low pre-growth communities in all regions except for the Midwest
and South Central. The price reduction paired with minimal changes in population in these
locations is consistent with turnover in the local population where some sorting based on
risk occurs. In the case of Midwest and South Central there are both minimal population
changes and no price adjustment. Living in these areas effectively becomes more expensive
but the real estate does not provide compensation. The evidence from the FEMA payments
suggests that at least for the South Central area the incidence of the disaster may be higher
on low-wealth households. This can explain why we do not observe any population effects –
these communities are locked in.
Overall, the regional results for housing and population are closely matched. They pro-
vide evidence for the interaction between revisions of perceived flood risk and existing de-
mand for new housing which ultimately determine whether more people will inhabit risky
locations.
5 Robustness
Relative Damage vs Flood Indicator
The results in this paper use an indicator for a flood based on a cutoff for minimum relative
damage. I investigate the extent to which actual relative damage affects the main results
regarding population. I introduce variations in damage by replacing the flood indicator with
three indicators for relative damage. These indicators reflect the lower 33th/33th-66th/upper
66th percentile respectively of the distribution of damages at the state level. Specifying the
main population model with them rather than a flood indicator allows us to examine whether
events with relatively higher damage are different from those with relatively lower one. The
20
results are shown in Table 8. Focusing on the models with controls we can see that all parts
of the damage distribution reduce population for the respective groups that are affected in
the main results. The effect of the upper 66th percentile is slightly lower while the lower 33th
percentile generally has higher effects. These are not statistically different from each other.
Local Social Organizations and Churches
A big literature on resilience after natural disasters emphasizes the importance of local
social capital (Aldrich 2012). To accommodate this I use information from the County
Business Patterns dataset which lists the total number of establishments at a zip code by
6-digit industry code. I calculate the total number of civic and social organizations (NAICS
813410) and religious organizations (NAICS 813110) per capita in each community and define
an indicator for locations with above state-median number. I then include it among the rest
of the controls in Xit. The results for population and real estate are listed in Table 9. The
coefficient estimates for the impact of higher level of social capital are listed at the bottom
of the table. The overall results are very similar to the baseline. Social capital weakens the
decline in the pre-flood trend for population and lowers the decline in the post period for
the real estate values. These results are consistent with the literature on social capital which
suggests that communities with higher endowment will do better after disasters.
6 Conclusion
This is the first study that investigates the effect of flood surprises using consistent national
data of insured and uninsured damages at the level of the community. It investigates how
changes in underlying flood risk affect the local population trajectory and real estate values.
I find that changes in risk expectations are much more important that the amount of overall
damage – at least in the case of lower scale events. Locations with a history of flooding do
not experience changes in population and real estate. This indicates that flooding is widely
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expected and the local population is already somewhat insulated from the risk with insur-
ance. Locations with flood surprises see a combination of declines in population and house
value depreciation. The level of pre-existing demand for new housing is critical. Attractive
communities that are surprised by a flood experience population declines and no housing
depreciation, a combination consistent with new comers steering away. Less attractive loca-
tions see predominately house price declines and stable population. Using these results to
interpret how climate change will affect communities within the US we will see three general
local outcome. First, risky locations will not see any changes. Second, attractive locations
where risk increases will experience population declines leading to stabilizing of population at
the pre-flood level. Third, locations where risk increase and where demand for new housing
is low will not see changes in population but will experience depreciation of housing.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Floods Freq. Percent Cum.
0 1,771 42.71 42.71
1 1,519 36.63 79.33
2 542 13.07 92.4
3 238 5.74 98.14
4 77 1.86 100
Total 4,147 100
Number of Floods
State 0 1 2 3+
Alabama 41 50 5
Arkansas 20 40 17
California 316 45 1
Colorado 38 23
Connecticut 36 33 7 5
Delaware 4 2
Florida 7 99 34 47
Georgia 99 43 12 3
Illinois 74 74 54 27
Indiana 38 88 6 4
Iowa 6 44 29
Kentucky 22 48 31 6
Louisiana 6 6 20 40
Maryland 29 5
Massachusetts 46 67 21 2
Minnesota 90 23 6 2
Mississippi 8 30 26 23
Missouri 38 48 30
Nevada 13 2
New Hampshire 2 24
New Jersey 12 83 14 77
New York 66 74 19 34
North Carolina 82 51 8 2
North Dakota 4 11
Ohio 89 73 34 6
Oklahoma 25 38 15
Oregon 45 10 2
Pennsylvania 39 82 49 31
Rhode Island 2 12 14
South Carolina 51 15
South Dakota 7 7 1
Tennessee 38 75
Texas 170 65 56
Vermont 3 13 2
Virginia 67 28 6 4
Washington 64 26
West Virginia 20 23 5 2
Wisconsin 58 46 7
Total 1771 1519 542 315
Relative Damage
Fl p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
1 0.02% 0.05% 0.14% 0.46% 0.87%
2 0.02% 0.06% 0.19% 0.69% 1.55%
3 0.02% 0.07% 0.25% 0.86% 1.72%
4 0.02% 0.09% 0.34% 1.27% 8.66%
Total Damage
Fl p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
1 0.64 1.67 5.02 16.14 42.39
2 0.64 1.80 5.70 20.75 47.18
3 0.79 2.45 9.14 33.90 76.74
4 0.83 3.42 13.50 69.68 213.80
Average Pop (1,000)
Fl p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
0 21 34 62 111 167
1 21 31 57 110 179
2 22 32 55 104 207
3 21 35 60 139 214
4 23 36 77 138 184
Population Growth
Fl p25 p50 p75 p90 p95
0 -0.04% 0.55% 1.36% 2.50% 3.44%
1 -0.15% 0.39% 1.14% 2.22% 3.18%
2 -0.24% 0.28% 0.97% 1.97% 2.90%
3 -0.27% 0.21% 0.75% 1.71% 2.51%
4 -0.20% 0.31% 0.96% 2.20% 3.12%
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Table 2: Flood Surprises and Insurance Payouts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln (Payouts)i ln (Payouts)i ln (Payouts)i ln (Payouts)i
HitSF 0.450*
(0.230)
HitSF × LSurprise 0.963***
(0.119)
HitSF × Northeast 0.0442
(0.588)
HitSF × Mid-Atlantic 0.706***
(0.228)
HitSF × Midwest -0.0915
(0.216)
HitSF × South Atlantic 1.048**
(0.472)
HitSF × South Central 0.209
(0.358)
HitSF × West -0.438
(0.307)
HitSF × Northeast × LSurp 1.338***
(0.145)
HitSF × Mid-Atlantic × LSurp 0.929***
(0.150)
HitSF × Mid West × LSurp 1.265***
(0.257)
HitSF × South Atlantic × LowSurp 0.624*
(0.339)
HitSF × South Central × LSurp 0.796***
(0.221)
HitSF × West × LSurp 1.668***
(0.185)
HitSF × Dam 0.428***
(0.0886)
HitSF × Dam × LSurprise 0.234***
(0.0276)
HitSF × Dam × Northeast 0.476***
(0.148)
HitSF × Dam × Mid-Atlantic 0.640***
(0.0508)
HitSF × Dam × Midwest 0.396***
(0.0554)
HitSF × Dam × South Atlantic 0.355***
(0.115)
HitSF × Dam × South Central 0.448***
(0.0840)
HitSF × Dam × West 0.366***
(0.0597)
HitSF × Dam × Northeast × LSurp 0.266***
(0.0593)
HitSF × Dam × Mid-Atlantic × LSurp 0.153***
(0.00957)
HitSF × Dam × Mid West × LSurp 0.298***
(0.0227)
HitSF × Dam × South Atlantic × LowSurp 0.241***
(0.0428)
HitSF × Dam × South Central × LSurp 0.171***
(0.0594)
HitSF × Dam × West × LSurp 0.317***
(0.0438)
Observations 3,443 3,443 3,443 3,443
R-squared 0.613 0.620 0.778 0.793
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ln (Payouts)i is log insurance payouts per capita at location i. Hit
SF
is an indicator for flooding at a single-flood location. Dam is total damage per capita. LSurp is an indicator
for a high history of flooding i.e. low-surprise event. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for
multiple-flood communities. Sample covers the period between 2000 and 2016. SE clustered by state.
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Table 3: Flood Surprises and Population Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnPopit lnPopit lnPopit lnPopit lnPopit lnPopit
HitSF -0.000840 -0.00918***
(0.00113) (0.00203)
PostHitSF -0.00396*** -0.00934***
(0.00144) (0.00278)
PostTrendSF -4.08e-05 -0.00404***
(0.000484) (0.000855)
HitSF × HSurp -0.00310** -0.0120***
(0.00121) (0.00241)
HitSF × LSurp 0.00292 -0.00487**
(0.00193) (0.00234)
PostHitSF × HSurp -0.00462*** -0.0103***
(0.00174) (0.00312)
PostHitSF × LSurp -0.00259 -0.00758**
(0.00217) (0.00309)
PostTrendSFd × HSurp -0.00148** -0.00582***
(0.000582) (0.000911)
PostTrendSF × LSurp 0.00213*** -0.00140
(0.000615) (0.000931)
HitSF × HSurp × LGr 0.00664*** -0.00305
(0.00115) (0.00243)
HitSF × HSurp × HGr -0.00552*** -0.0141***
(0.00142) (0.00243)
HitSF × LSurp × LGr 0.0118** 0.00347
(0.00537) (0.00505)
HitSF × LSurp × HGr 0.000115 -0.00752***
(0.00132) (0.00210)
PostHitSF × HSurp× LGr 0.000943 -0.00530
(0.00190) (0.00333)
PostHitSF × HSurp× HGr -0.00534*** -0.0113***
(0.00206) (0.00315)
PostHitSF × LSurp× LGr 0.00253 -0.00267
(0.00478) (0.00474)
PostHitSF × LSurp× HGr -0.00329 -0.00841***
(0.00213) (0.00318)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× LGr 0.00695*** 0.00222**
(0.000597) (0.000894)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× HGr -0.00410*** -0.00788***
(0.000655) (0.000917)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× LGr 0.00891*** 0.00498***
(0.000874) (0.00104)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× HGr -0.000591 -0.00381***
(0.000693) (0.000967)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.005 0.023 0.009 0.028 0.039 0.052
Xit Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.HitSF is an indicator for flood event. PostHitSF is an indicator for the
period following the first year of impact. PostTrendSF is a linear trend starting the in the period following the
impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event. LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative
population growth 5 years prior to the event. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional controls:
indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local
economy; above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do not report the
coefficients for multiple-flood communities.
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Table 4: Flood Surprises and Real Estate Values
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TopTier MiddleTier BottomTier
HitSF × HSurp × LGr -0.0338*** -0.0230* -0.0204
(0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0162)
HitSF × HSurp × HGr -0.00211 0.00941 0.0175
(0.00900) (0.00916) (0.0117)
HitSF × LSurp × LGr -0.0147 0.00534 0.00815
(0.0138) (0.0129) (0.0167)
HitSF × LSurp × HGr 0.00410 0.0132 0.0170
(0.00944) (0.00943) (0.0120)
PostHitSF × HSurp× LGr -0.0425*** -0.0439** -0.0553***
(0.0153) (0.0174) (0.0204)
PostHitSF × HSurp× HGr -0.00408 0.00425 0.00116
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0142)
PostHitSF × LSurp× LGr -0.0117 0.00724 -0.0166
(0.0176) (0.0173) (0.0200)
PostHitSF × LSurp× HGr -0.000138 -0.00135 -0.00581
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0149)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× LGr -0.000319 0.00314 0.00870*
(0.00365) (0.00403) (0.00471)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× HGr -0.00526* -0.00270 0.000444
(0.00278) (0.00296) (0.00331)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× LGr -0.00615 -0.00567 0.00167
(0.00402) (0.00416) (0.00450)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× HGr -0.00588** -0.00341 0.000448
(0.00290) (0.00297) (0.00362)
Observations 61,454 60,825 54,459
Within R-squared 0.02 0.023 0.021
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Top/Middle/BottomTier refers
to the log of the respective house price Zillow index. HitSF is an indi-
cator for flood event. PostHitSF is an indicator for the period follow-
ing the first year of impact. PostTrendSF is a linear trend starting the
in the period following the impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a
low/high surprise event. LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative
population growth 5 years prior to the event. Sample: 2000/2016. SE
clustered by community. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc.
of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-
based local economy; above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot.
damage.
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Table 5: Low-wealth Incidence in Low-Growth Communities
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ln(FemaPay) ln(FemaPay)
HitSF × Dam 0.859***
(0.0141)
HitSF × Dam × LSurp -0.00489
(0.00808)
HitSF × Dam × LGr 0.0307**
(0.0143)
HitSF × Dam × Northeast 0.923***
(0.0285)
HitSF × Dam × Mid-Atlantic 0.816***
(0.0188)
HitSF × Dam × Midwest 0.911***
(0.0154)
HitSF × Dam × South Atlantic 0.816***
(0.0162)
HitSF × Dam × South Central 0.881***
(0.0102)
HitSF × Dam × West 0.821***
(0.0247)
HitSF × Dam × LSurp × Northeast -0.0435
(0.0392)
HitSF × Dam × LSurp × Mid-Atlantic 0.0140
(0.0244)
HitSF × Dam × LSurp × Midwest -0.0116
(0.0143)
HitSF × Dam × LSurp × South Atlantic 0.00162
(0.0143)
HitSF × Dam × LSurp × South Central -0.0158
(0.0130)
HitSF × Dam × LSurp × West -0.0159
(0.0243)
HitSF × Dam × LGr × Northeast 0.0318**
(0.0124)
HitSF × Dam × LGr × Mid-Atlantic 0.0253***
(0.00757)
HitSF × Dam × LGr × Midwest 0.00139
(0.0190)
HitSF × Dam × LGr × South Atlantic -0.00168
(0.0267)
HitSF × Dam × LGr × South Central 0.0359*
(0.0191)
HitSF × Dam × LGr × West -0.109**
(0.0521)
Observations 3,105 3,145
R-squared 0.973 0.971
Additional Controls Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FemaPay refers to total FEMA
relief per capita, Dam refers to total FEMA damage recorded, LSurp is
an indicator for low-surprise event, and LGr is an indicator for low pre-
growth location. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by state. Additional
controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba dam-
age; above median non-construction-based local economy; above median
renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage.
27
Table 6: Regional Population Responses
lnPopstit
HighSurprise LowSurprise
VARIABLES LowGrowth HighGrowth LowGrowth HighGrowth
HitSF × Northeast -0.00754** -0.0101*** -0.00669* -0.00998***
(0.00303) (0.00286) (0.00396) (0.00273)
HitSF × Mid-Atlantic -0.00504 -0.0163*** 0.00213 -0.00901*
(0.00540) (0.00488) (0.00376) (0.00463)
HitSF × Midwest 0.00438 -0.0137*** -0.000326 -0.00311
(0.00355) (0.00381) (0.00577) (0.00295)
HitSF × South Atlantic 0.000893 -0.00667 0.00518 -0.00812
(0.00687) (0.00576) (0.00532) (0.00507)
HitSF × South Central -0.00315 -0.0141** 0.0184 -0.00271
(0.00668) (0.00630) (0.0164) (0.00611)
HitSF × West -5.64e-05 -0.0189*** -0.00613 -0.00849
(0.0104) (0.00660) (0.0123) (0.00832)
PostHitSF × Northeast -0.0142*** -0.0175*** -0.0122* -0.0139***
(0.00527) (0.00435) (0.00676) (0.00455)
PostHitSF × Mid-Atlantic -0.00925 -0.0113 -0.00333 -0.0113
(0.00998) (0.00786) (0.00711) (0.00765)
PostHitSF × Midwest 0.000359 -0.0134*** -0.00254 0.000863
(0.00434) (0.00450) (0.00531) (0.00403)
PostHitSF × South Atlantic -0.00438 -0.00197 -0.00829 -0.0164**
(0.00908) (0.00794) (0.00793) (0.00800)
PostHitSF × South Central -0.00242 -0.00915 0.0113 0.00184
(0.00815) (0.00802) (0.0143) (0.00999)
PostHitSF × West 0.00316 -0.0267*** -0.0112 -0.0132
(0.0130) (0.00820) (0.0163) (0.0105)
PostTrendSF × Northeast 0.00171 -0.000892 0.00366 -0.00297**
(0.00154) (0.00147) (0.00230) (0.00149)
PostTrendSF × Mid-Atlantic 0.00374 -0.00868*** 0.00531** -0.00171
(0.00290) (0.00268) (0.00252) (0.00256)
PostTrendSF × Midwest 0.00396*** -0.00714*** 0.00443*** -0.00498***
(0.00117) (0.00157) (0.00129) (0.00133)
PostTrendSF × South Atlantic 0.000617 -0.0112*** 0.00492* -0.00305
(0.00293) (0.00249) (0.00276) (0.00250)
PostTrendSF × South Central 0.00477*** -0.00460*** 0.00850*** -0.000660
(0.00183) (0.00176) (0.00277) (0.00263)
PostTrendSF × West 0.00638* -0.0106*** 0.00903** -0.00701**
(0.00362) (0.00306) (0.00446) (0.00281)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Consult notes for Table 3 for details. Sample:
2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc.
of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local economy;
above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage.
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Table 7: Regional Real Estate Responses for Top Tier Housing
TopTier House Index
HighSurprise LowSurprise
VARIABLES LowGrowth HighGrowth LowGrowth HighGrowth
HitSF × Northeast -0.0404** -0.0296* -0.0280 -0.0381**
(0.0191) (0.0153) (0.0256) (0.0151)
HitSF × Mid-Atlantic 0.00921 0.0203 0.0108 -0.00540
(0.0293) (0.0260) (0.0332) (0.0253)
HitSF × Midwest -0.0196 0.00228 0.00589 0.0163
(0.0222) (0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0148)
HitSF × South Atlantic -0.0917*** 0.0378** -0.0200 0.0232
(0.0251) (0.0164) (0.0308) (0.0175)
HitSF × South Central -0.00133 0.00963 0.0132 0.0459**
(0.0228) (0.0193) (0.0245) (0.0218)
HitSF × West -0.159*** -0.00704 -0.120*** -0.0419
(0.0300) (0.0274) (0.0299) (0.0282)
PostHitSF × Northeast -0.0572** -0.0373* -0.0356 -0.0519**
(0.0268) (0.0221) (0.0355) (0.0220)
PostHitSF × Mid-Atlantic -0.0959*** -0.0261 -0.0492 -0.0597*
(0.0370) (0.0333) (0.0414) (0.0323)
PostHitSF × Midwest 0.000684 0.0177 0.0161 0.0361**
(0.0256) (0.0167) (0.0234) (0.0163)
PostHitSF × South Atlantic -0.0428 0.0459* -0.000888 0.0241
(0.0395) (0.0253) (0.0372) (0.0295)
PostHitSF × South Central 0.0134 0.0173 0.0339 0.0424
(0.0296) (0.0240) (0.0359) (0.0266)
PostHitSF × West -0.219*** -0.0265 -0.0863* -0.0806**
(0.0424) (0.0330) (0.0501) (0.0387)
PostTrendSF × Northeast -0.0154** -0.0126** -0.00827 -0.00917
(0.00642) (0.00568) (0.00969) (0.00604)
PostTrendSF × Mid-Atlantic 0.0287*** 0.00497 0.0218** 0.0128
(0.00967) (0.00966) (0.00913) (0.00814)
PostTrendSF × Midwest -0.00199 -0.00443 -0.00780 -0.00386
(0.00522) (0.00420) (0.00493) (0.00430)
PostTrendSF × South Atlantic -0.0280*** -0.00343 -0.0201* -0.0182**
(0.0101) (0.00815) (0.0117) (0.00780)
PostTrendSF × South Central 0.00462 -0.00172 -0.00222 0.00628
(0.00758) (0.00576) (0.00760) (0.00599)
PostTrendSF × West -0.00554 -0.00358 0.00233 -0.0103
(0.0107) (0.00710) (0.0266) (0.00821)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Consult notes for Table 4. Sample: 2000/2016.
SE clustered by community. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of
fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local economy;
above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage.
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Table 8: Population Responses with Spline Damage Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lnPopit lnPopit lnPopit lnPopit
HitSF × Dam1 -0.000581 -0.00872***
(0.00181) (0.00241)
PostHitSF × Dam1 -0.00343 -0.00833**
(0.00221) (0.00342)
PostTrendSF × Dam1 0.000144 -0.00371***
(0.000606) (0.000927)
HitSF × Dam2 -0.00191 -0.00995***
(0.00162) (0.00220)
PostHitSF × Dam2 -0.00455* -0.00958***
(0.00238) (0.00296)
PostTrendSF × Dam -0.00104 -0.00473***
(0.000800) (0.000931)
HitSF × Dam3 0.000262 -0.00760***
(0.00134) (0.00229)
PostHitSF × Dam3 -0.00383* -0.00861**
(0.00200) (0.00343)
PostTrendSF × Dam3 0.000915 -0.00277***
(0.000675) (0.00102)
HitSF × HSurp × Dam1 -0.00441** -0.0130***
(0.00173) (0.00327)
HitSF × LSurp × Dam1 0.00823* 0.00108
(0.00433) (0.00360)
PostHitSF × HSurp × Dam1 -0.00679*** -0.0143***
(0.00249) (0.00482)
PostHitSF × LSurp × Dam1 0.00460 0.00313
(0.00424) (0.00420)
PostTrendSFd × HSurp × Dam1 -0.00118 -0.00498***
(0.000730) (0.00126)
PostTrendSF × LSurp × Dam1 0.00292*** -0.000330
(0.000887) (0.00116)
HitSF × HSurp × Dam2 -0.00276 -0.0120***
(0.00195) (0.00300)
HitSF × LSurp × Dam2 -0.000601 -0.00753**
(0.00274) (0.00309)
PostHitSF × HSurp × Dam2 -0.00214 -0.0107***
(0.00312) (0.00406)
PostHitSF × LSurp × Dam2 -0.00856** -0.00972**
(0.00350) (0.00399)
PostTrendSFd × HSurp × Dam2 -0.00280*** -0.00678***
(0.00105) (0.00124)
PostTrendSF × LSurp × Dam2 0.00156 -0.00155
(0.00108) (0.00125)
HitSF × HSurp × Dam3 -0.000564 -0.00982***
(0.00173) (0.00319)
HitSF × LSurp × Dam3 0.00112 -0.00446*
(0.00180) (0.00261)
PostHitSF × HSurp × Dam3 -0.00357 -0.0122**
(0.00258) (0.00479)
PostHitSF × LSurp × Dam3 -0.00420 -0.00315
(0.00278) (0.00399)
PostTrendSFd × HSurp × Dam3 -0.000159 -0.00412***
(0.000863) (0.00139)
PostTrendSF × LSurp × Dam3 0.00188** -0.00134
(0.000879) (0.00128)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 70,403
Within R-squared 0.007 0.02 0.019 0.041
Xit Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Dam1/Dam2/Dam3 are indicators for the lower 33th
percentile/33th-66th percentile/upper 66th of damage within the state. HitSF is an indicator
for flood event. PostHitSF is an indicator for the period following the first year of impact.
PostTrendSF is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. LSurp/HSurp
is an indicator for a low/high surprise event. LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative
population growth 5 years prior to the event. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by com-
munity. Additional controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba
damage; above median non-construction-based local economy; above median renter fraction;
below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do not report the coefficients for
multiple-flood communities.
(5) (6)
VARIABLES lnPopit lnPopit
HitSF × HSurp × LGr ×Dam1 0.00739*** 0.00615***
(0.00151) (0.00215)
HitSF × HSurp × HGr ×Dam1 -0.00683*** -0.0166***
(0.00203) (0.00390)
HitSF × LSurp × LGr ×Dam1 0.0202 0.00558
(0.0129) (0.00827)
HitSF × LSurp × HGr ×Dam1 0.00349* -0.00192
(0.00199) (0.00253)
PostHitSF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam1 -0.00139 0.000660
(0.00268) (0.00441)
PostHitSF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam1 -0.00679** -0.0168***
(0.00291) (0.00586)
PostHitSF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam1 0.0111 0.00513
(0.0109) (0.00755)
PostHitSF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam1 0.00243 0.00149
(0.00316) (0.00431)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam1 0.00800*** 0.00562***
(0.000880) (0.00115)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam1 -0.00368*** -0.00716***
(0.000809) (0.00149)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam1 0.00909*** 0.00400***
(0.00167) (0.00149)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam1 0.000210 -0.00203
(0.000919) (0.00139)
HitSF × HSurp × LGr ×Dam2 0.00732*** 0.00627**
(0.00180) (0.00279)
HitSF × HSurp × HGr ×Dam2 -0.00545** -0.0159***
(0.00234) (0.00362)
HitSF × LSurp × LGr ×Dam2 0.0126 -0.000747
(0.00971) (0.0100)
HitSF × LSurp × HGr ×Dam2 -0.00372* -0.00930***
(0.00196) (0.00278)
PostHitSF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam2 0.00361 0.00499
(0.00352) (0.00567)
PostHitSF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam2 -0.00372 -0.0149***
(0.00371) (0.00473)
PostHitSF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam2 0.00129 -0.00434
(0.00796) (0.00834)
PostHitSF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam2 -0.00985** -0.0107**
(0.00382) (0.00458)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam2 0.00739*** 0.00514***
(0.000825) (0.00121)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam2 -0.00572*** -0.00926***
(0.00124) (0.00143)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam2 0.0103*** 0.00628***
(0.00141) (0.00162)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam2 -0.00115 -0.00364**
(0.00127) (0.00147)
HitSF × HSurp × LGr ×Dam3 0.00429* 0.00324
(0.00236) (0.00324)
HitSF × HSurp × HGr ×Dam3 -0.00279 -0.0130***
(0.00206) (0.00393)
HitSF × LSurp × LGr ×Dam3 0.00315* -0.00757
(0.00187) (0.00627)
HitSF × LSurp × HGr ×Dam3 0.000665 -0.00429
(0.00241) (0.00331)
PostHitSF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam3 0.000924 0.00185
(0.00288) (0.00481)
PostHitSF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam3 -0.00578* -0.0167***
(0.00335) (0.00620)
PostHitSF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam3 -0.00569* -0.0103
(0.00331) (0.00657)
PostHitSF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam3 -0.00241 -0.000780
(0.00358) (0.00522)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× LGr ×Dam3 0.00470*** 0.00259**
(0.000762) (0.00122)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× HGr ×Dam3 -0.00245** -0.00580***
(0.00111) (0.00180)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× LGr ×Dam3 0.00758*** 0.00357**
(0.00107) (0.00158)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× HGr ×Dam3 -0.000908 -0.00362**
(0.00102) (0.00164)
Observations 70,403 70,403
R-squared 0.061 0.081
Xit Controls No Yes
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Table 9: Population and Real Estate Responses Controlling for Local Churches and Social
Organizations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES lnPopit lnPopit lnPopit TopTier MiddleTier BottomTier
HitSF -0.0101***
(0.00230)
PostHitSF -0.00948***
(0.00318)
PostTrendSF -0.00545***
(0.000970)
HitSF × HSurp -0.0128***
(0.00244)
HitSF × LSurp -0.00577**
(0.00287)
PostHitSF × HSurp -0.0103***
(0.00336)
PostHitSF × LSurp -0.00772**
(0.00362)
PostTrendSFd × HSurp -0.00723***
(0.00101)
PostTrendSF × LSurp -0.00281***
(0.00104)
HitSF × HSurp × LGr -0.00325 -0.0369*** -0.0261* -0.0275*
(0.00244) (0.0125) (0.0135) (0.0160)
HitSF × HSurp × HGr -0.0141*** -0.00445 0.00703 0.0122
(0.00246) (0.00917) (0.00930) (0.0118)
HitSF × LSurp × LGr 0.00341 -0.0183 0.00181 0.000337
(0.00603) (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.0169)
HitSF × LSurp × HGr -0.00758*** 0.00145 0.0107 0.0114
(0.00234) (0.00961) (0.00966) (0.0120)
PostHitSF × HSurp× LGr -0.00501 -0.0545*** -0.0569*** -0.0694***
(0.00356) (0.0158) (0.0177) (0.0207)
PostHitSF × HSurp× HGr -0.0108*** -0.0127 -0.00556 -0.00958
(0.00336) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0144)
PostHitSF × LSurp× LGr -0.00213 -0.0249 -0.00689 -0.0321
(0.00561) (0.0183) (0.0177) (0.0205)
PostHitSF × LSurp× HGr -0.00808** -0.00908 -0.0110 -0.0167
(0.00348) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0154)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× LGr 0.00124 0.00144 0.00518 0.00855*
(0.00104) (0.00379) (0.00422) (0.00500)
PostTrendSF × HSurp× HGr -0.00858*** -0.00398 -0.00118 0.000514
(0.00100) (0.00281) (0.00299) (0.00339)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× LGr 0.00400*** -0.00438 -0.00366 0.00149
(0.00120) (0.00414) (0.00427) (0.00464)
PostTrendSF × LSurp× HGr -0.00448*** -0.00474 -0.00207 0.000298
(0.00105) (0.00292) (0.00299) (0.00369)
HitSF × Social 0.00222 0.00208 0.000223 0.00560 0.00552 0.0137*
(0.00194) (0.00194) (0.00210) (0.00581) (0.00606) (0.00729)
PostHitSF × Social 0.00109 0.000896 -0.000535 0.0204*** 0.0228*** 0.0271***
(0.00256) (0.00255) (0.00258) (0.00753) (0.00790) (0.00959)
PostTrendSF × Social 0.00284*** 0.00284*** 0.00150** -0.00265 -0.00318 0.000614
(0.000711) (0.000705) (0.000680) (0.00184) (0.00201) (0.00230)
Observations 70,403 70,403 70,403 61,530 60,920 54,554
Within R-squared 0.025 0.03 0.052 0.023 0.026 0.025
Xit Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.HitSF is an indicator for flood event. PostHitSF is an indicator
for the period following the first year of impact. PostTrendSF is a linear trend starting the in the period
following the impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event. LGr/HGr is an indicator for
positive/negative population growth 5 years prior to the event. Social is an indicator for above median number
of social organizations and churches per capita. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional
controls: indicators for top 66th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-
based local economy; above median renter fraction; below 33th perc. tot. damage. The estimation results do
not report the coefficients for multiple-flood communities.
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Figure 1: Locations with Single and Multiple Floods between 2003–2013
Figure 2: Locations with Flood Surprises between 2003–2013
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Figure 3: Population Growth of Milford vs New Haven and Bridgeport
Figure 4: Population and Real Estate Values at Milford vs New Haven and Bridgeport
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